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On such a full sea are we now aﬂ  oat.
And we must take the current when it serves, 
or lose our ventures.
Shakespeare
From Armenia in 1987 to Indonesia in 2004, to New 
Orleans in 2005, and now to Haiti in 2010, we have 
embarked on a sobering journey in public health logistics. 
Previous standards of disaster response crumbled when 
tested. New standards are now tested in real situations 
rather than in theory [1].
Even in an unforgiving environment, the principles of 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) still 
apply to the the command structure, albeit in a modiﬁ  ed 
form [2]. We learned the diﬃ   cult lesson that trauma is 
not the major issue following a disaster [3]. Th  e tradi-
tional inﬂ  ux of ad hoc rescue teams ﬂ  ooding into the area 
actually hinders progress, as it did after the 9/11 disaster 
in New York City [4]. Safety provided support personnel 
and security of supply channels have always rivaled the 
good intentions of would-be rescue teams [5].
Mass media commentary on disasters tends to soften 
the horror of the reality by reﬂ  ecting a compassionate 
fantasy: the illusion that human altruism conquers all [6]. 
Th  is media apparition also inadvertently reinforces the 
similar illusion that all assistance is eﬀ  ective assistance. 
We share the experience of a well-intentioned medical 
group whose involvement puts the usual media coverage 
into a realistic perspective.
Surgical and critical care teams may have awareness of 
unique supply and transportation issues but they have 
little oversight of on-site security, infrastructure, 
command, re-supply, or support systems. A motivated, 
committed and well-equipped trauma team traveled to 
Haiti several days after the earthquake for the purpose of 
medical assistance. Th  eir destination was a designated 
hospital to establish comprehensive emergent surgical 
intervention for orthopedic injuries.
Th  e multidisciplinary team of surgeons and support 
personnel departed with an extensive medication list and 
comprehensive equipment, including a functioning 
portable operating room and postoperative recovery area 
(D Lorich, personal communication). Th  ey planned to 
quickly replenish expended equipment by private jet 
through their corporate connections.
On arrival, the team found that the expected ground 
support from Partners in Health was nonexistent. Th  eir 
ﬂ   ight logistics were either delayed or cancelled. On 
ultimate arrival, the designated site did not have func-
tional operating facilities. Among other problems, there 
was no running water and only a limited electrical supply.
Th  eir backup option was the Community Hospital of 
Haiti, which turned out to be more functional but 
overloaded with patients. Anesthesia machines were 
nonfunctional; other needed materials were in short 
supply or inadequate for their needs, and there was only a 
ragtag group of voluntary health providers who had made 
it there on their own.
Th   e team found no one in charge at the site. Th  ey  had 
established the ﬁ  rst functional acute care hospital in the 
disaster area, yet no one arrived to assess and coordinate 
the activities. Th   e military could not or would not protect 
the resupply of equipment or protect from pilfering.
Th   ere was no security for the team, despite promises to 
provide it from the New York City Police Department 
and the Fire Department, City of New York. Procedures 
were begun on a hit or miss basis, quickly generating a 
need for replenished supplies. Th   e re-supply plane landed 
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airport and reaching the team.
Having completed more than 100 procedures over 
several days, the team was exhausted and disillusioned. 
On the morning of the team’s proposed departure, a huge 
inﬂ  ux of new patients forced a lockdown of the facility, 
closing its gates to the outside, resulting in the crowd 
becoming angry and hostile. Th  at same morning, the 
team noted that many of their operative patients were 
looking septic and there was no demonstrable medical 
follow-up available. Supplies were not being replenished 
and safety was a huge concern.
Ultimately, the team decided to make their way to the 
Port ‘a Prince airport through the assistance of a private 
hospital benefactor. Armed Jamaican soldiers were 
necessary to escort the team past the hostile crowd 
surrounding the hospital. On making their way back to 
the airport in the back of a pickup track, the team hailed 
a commercial plane carrying cargo to Montreal and had a 
private jet pick them up there.
In retrospect, the team’s assessment of the situation is 
as follows. Th   e amount of human devastation was im  pos-
sible to comprehend before arrival. Th   e lack of a medical 
infrastructure and support from Haitian physicians was 
underestimated and underassessed. Finally, there was a 
lack of organization on the ground and a lack of any 
security at all at the hospital.
Th   e problems illustrated by this team’s experience are 
encapsulated by Michael DeBakey’s famous comment: 
‘All the circumstances of war surgery thus do violence to 
civilian concepts of traumatic surgery’ – a statement that 
remains as true today as it did in 1942 when he developed 
the ﬁ  rst Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals [7].
Th  e ultimate solutions to these problems are more 
subtle, requiring a long-term commitment on the part of 
both individuals and organizations to partner with 
experienced charitable nongovernmental organizations 
around the globe [8]. Th   ese partnerships will provide the 
teaching, training and, ultimately, the technology for 
disaster areas to become more reliant on their own 
resources. Th   is development will include not only 
medical outreach, but also infrastructure development.
Th  is exchange will facilitate personnel from the more 
developed countries to learn how to live and work under 
unfamiliar austere circumstances. Th  is new learning 
curve will require a paradigm shift in the attitudes of the 
volunteers as they adapt to the requirements of the new 
and potentially hostile environments.
Th   is is but one team’s experience. Th   ey learned lessons 
that should be used to guide other future teams who are 
not already part of a uniﬁ  ed, integrated infrastructure. 
Th  e team’s experience also points out both the major 
problems associated with modern disaster response and 
a possible solution.
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